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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter was tried before a jury commencing
on Thursday, 14 November, 1957, and concluding on Monday, 18 November, 1957. William H. Evans, deceased, had
been married to Annie B. Evans during his lifetime and
left Annie B. Evans as his widow at the time of his death.
That. the defendant arid Appellant, Morgan Evans, was
the brother of William H. Evans, deceased, and during
the lifetime of William H. Evans, deceased, he and his
wife, had lived a great portion of their life in a house
belonging to Morgan Evans and occupied by him who
had never married, and that at the time of the death of
William H. Eva·ns, deceased, had only shortly moved out
of the premises to a domocile of their own.
Issue was joined upon the complaint of the plaintiff
asking for the ownership of one half of certain cattle
branded 44 and upon the answer and cross complaint of
the defendant by the terms of which said defendant denied that said deceased had owned any interest in said
cattle, admitted joint ownership of grazing rights and
farm land that had been used in connection therewith,
asked for a parti tio·n of the farm land, and in the alter~
native asked for money expended in caring for the cattle in the event the court found that the plaintill owned
any interest in said cattle. Defendant consented to the
partition of the farm land and both parties joined in
asking the court to sell said farm land and to divide the
money derived therefrom.
Durham Morris, Esquire, attorney for the plaintiff,
had entered into the employment of William H. Evans,
deceased, and Morgan Evans, prior to the death of said
Willia1n H. Evans, deceased, to arrange a collection of
certain money from D. G. Page, and did do so and was
to follow up the collection and was to receive 25)t of
said items for his services. That the last payment thereunder was received under the terms of said settlement
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in 1958 and after deducting 25% therefrom said attorney
paid the balance thereof over to the parties herein named. That until this last payment was collected in 1958
said attorney was employed for several years prior to
the commencement of this action by said William H.
Evans, deceased, and Morgan Evans. That at the time
this action was commenced by said attorney the D. G.
Page item was not completed nor was it completed at
the time this matter was tried, but the matter has been
completed, and the money collected and paid by said attorney after deducting his 25 jf fee, since notice of appeal was filed in connection with this matter. That
many items were volunteered by said attorney and used
against Morgan Evans without his consent, to the prejudice of the jury, while this attorney and client relationship existed between said Durham Morris and said Morgan Evans. That the trial court failed to take any action
whatsoever to protect this attorney and client relationship.
The jury found for the plaintiff on most issues with
some monetary items to the defendant to pay for the expenses he had incurred in running said cattle.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. That the trial court erred in allowing this matter
to be presented to the jury at all after the disclosure of
an existing attorney and client relationship between the
plaintiff's attorney and the defendant.
2. That the trial court erred in failing to allow a
portion of defendant's objection to plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THIS
MATTER TO BE PRESENTED TO THE JURY AT ALL
AFTER THE DISCLOSURE OF AN EXISTING ATTORNEY AND CLIENT RELATIONSIDP BETWEEN
TH·E PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY AND THE DEFENDANT.
Very early in the trial of this matter it came to
light before the trial court that there was still an existing attorney and client relationship between the defendand and the plaintiff's attorney. The transcript of evidence shows that during the direct examination of the
first witness this came to light. This is shown at the
time of the identification of Exhibit "1" on page 9, Line
11 of the transcript and continuing therein to page 13,
Line 26. At that time Mrs. Evans in identifying the D. G.
Page lease testified that there was still money coming
on the matter and that she had not seen it for approximately 5 years until the time of identification and that
she had not known where the instrument was. This
showed that same was volunteered by counsel at that
time without knowledge of the plaintiff. The transcript
will sho\V that this was before the noon recess during the
first day of a prolonged trial, during which there were
constant violations of an existing attorney and client relationship. The trial court on its own motion should
have stopped the trial at that time and discharged the
jury, and failing to do so has done irreparable damage
to the defendant's substantive rights inasmuch as it
would now be impossible to retry this matter in Beaver
County and that the volunteering of this i'nformation by
counsel has now made plaintiff aware of same to where
on a retrial same could be subpoenied.
Further violations are sho\vn in the transcript of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

testimony on Page 161, Line 5; Page 164, Line 17 to Page
167, Line 21; Page 170, line 23 to Page 172, Line 6; Page
175, Line 10 to Page 176, Line 27; Page 176, Line 30 to
Page 178, Line 29; Page 222, Line 8 to Line 25; Page 253,
Line 21 to Page 257, Line 27. It is again clearly shown
that the work was not completed on Page 166, Line 24
to Line 30 of the transcript of said testimony. There is a
complete breakdown in the attorney and client relationships and confidences in the calling of the defenda·nt as
an adverse witness and questioning about the matter for
which said attorney was employed as is clearly shown
by the transcript at page 153 to page 234 and again at
page 248 to page 268. Objections were made at various
places on the basis of an existing attorney and client relationship. However, the trial court was never able to
see this matter and ruled as though the attorney had
been subpoened i'nto court with the information. In all
probability that ruling would have been correct had the
fact situation been that, but there is a great difference in
the position of an attorney subpoened into court, not as
an advocate for either party, and being questioned and
made to produce exhibits and information as of the nature of this matter, and the same attorney voluntarily
going into court as an advocate and heartlessly grilling
a person by whom he is employed in connection with another matter, and said grilling is about the subject matter of the employment between said attorney and said
person, which has not as yet been completed.
Admittedly, the undersigned is a novice at the practice of law, but after going through this trial, the undersigned cannot help but feel that said undersigned has
entirely failed to show the trial court this flagrant violation. After a great deal of deliberation that undersigned
cannot come forth with the thought that the trial judge,
that heard this rna tter, intentionally allowed this type
of violation and disregard of the client's rights and all
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that an attorney holds sacred, and therefore must conclude that the undersigned has failed in his job as an
advocate in showing the trial court the flagrant nature
of this abuse.
McWhirter vs. Donaldson, 36 U 293, 104 P. 731
charges an attorney to refrain from entering into an alliance or incurring any obligation connected with litigation in which he is engaged as counsel that would place
him in position where his personal interest would be
adverse to those of his client. In the matter now before
this court certai'nly counsel has not followed this doctrine. The undersigned well remembers his recent la\v
school days and the statement that no one can serve two
masters. Admittedly, country practice is full of situations
where a practitioner wakes up attempting to serve two
masters. However, I believe that the course is withdrawal if an attorney gets i'nto this position other than
intentionally, going ahead and attempting to determine which client should be benefited and which should
be harmed by continuing representation.
Surely, a trial court, cannot turn its back upon an
attorney representing one party in litigation, who admittedly has unfinished business in his office for the
other party of said litigation. Our Utah Code Annotated,
Title 78-51-26, Subsection 5 reads as follows: "To maintain inviolate the confidences, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets, of his client." Certainly the
legislature meant for the courts to enforce this section of
the statute or they would not have included same in our
current Codification of the law.
An outstanding example or standard for this situation is found in the old Corpus Juris, Volume 6, page 590
and 591 under Attorney and Client, Section 49 (b) Representing Conflicting Interests, note 65 taken from In Re
Boone, 83 Fed. 944. "The test of inconsistency is not whe-
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ther the attorney has ever appeared for the party against
whom he now proposes to appear, but it is whether his
accepting the new retainer will require him, in forwarding the interests of his new client, to do anything which
will injuriously affect his former client in any rna tter
in which he formerly represented him, and also whether
he \"viii be called upon, in his new relation to use against
his former client any knowledge or information acquired
through their former connection." Can we say in this
matter now before this court that this standard has been
followed?
In regard to representing Adverse Interests Corpus
Juris, Volume 6, Page 619, Section 105 states, "It is the
general and well settled rule that an attorney who has
acted as such for one side may not render services professionally in the same case to the other side, nor i'n any
event, whether it is in the same case or not, may he assume a position hostile to his client, and one inimical to
the very interests he was engaged to protect, unless he
is expressly authorized so to do; and it makes no difference in this respect whether or not the relation itself has
been terminated, for the obligation of fidelity and loyally still continues." Had this standard been followed in the
matter now before this court certainly plaintiff's counsel
would have refused to represent either of these parties.
Certainly the trial court erred in the standard applied
and should have applied this standard and not allowed
this matter to go to the jury.
POINT 2
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
ALLOW A PORTION OF DEFENDANT'S OBJE'CTIONS
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
DISBURSEMENTS.
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The court's attention is invited to the testimony of
J. Pratt Allred in the transcript, which commences at
page 117 and terminates at page 125. There is nothing In
his testimony except the identification of items that
were admitted by the pleadings. The answer of the defendant admitted that the grazing rights were jointly
owned. Mr. Allred's entire testimony is to the effect that
his office records showed this.
At this point one becomes concerned with what is
the purpose of pleadings. Items that are admitted are
still proven by witnesses brought at great inconvenience
to them and great expense, to stand around a court roon1
and spend 20 minutes in testimony identifying items
which are concerned with a subject matter that has been
admitted. The cost of this item is objected to, and the
trial court overrules the objections. The result is, that
your client pays for the costs of proving items that he
has already admitted. Under those conditions what is
the purpose of ever admitting anything? Why not deny
on the chance that proof may fail? Certainly the thought
of notice pleading is to cut down on costs and wasting
time proving items that are admitted. Certainly when
this is done and proof is made regardless, the person
who admits the items should not be assessed the costs of
proving same.

CONCLUSIONS
That a trial court has a duty to protect the rights of
an individual who comes before said trial as a defendant
from plaintiff's attorney, who admits that there is still
unfinished business between said attorney and said defendant and who is volunteering documents and information gained from said defendant in the course of said un-
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finished business against the defendant. That a trial
court should not allow costs to prove rna tters already
admitted.
Respectfully submitted,
PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for Appellant.
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